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When a party to a suit lacks the right to appeal, the authority of the
presiding judge to determine the litigant's fate is virtually absolute. By
allowing the correction of injustices resulting from mistakes of law and
heterodox interpretations of settled doctrine, the right to appellate review
acts as a fetter to this enormous power of the nisi prius judge. It is there-
fore noteworthy that in Federal criminal cases any mid-trial evidentiary
ruling that favors the defendant is forever insulated from review.
Under present Federal statutory law, the Government may only seek
review from evidentiary rulings made before jeopardy has attached.' As a
result, any evidentiary ruling adverse to the prosecution made after the
trial has begun is not appealable as an interlocutory ruling. The eviden-
tiary matter can only be appealed after a final judgement, i.e., after the
verdict. However, in the only instance when the Government cares to ap-
peal the adverse ruling-when the defendant is acquitted-appeal is pre-
cluded by the double jeopardy clause.2 The Government is therefore faced
with a situation in which mid-trial suppression and exclusion orders are
never reviewable. This result can be disastrous for the prosecution if the
suppression or exclusion was made erroneously and the acquittal was
predicated on the fact that the jury never heard the inculpatory evidence.
The above scenario suggests that all evidentiary rulings must be made
before trial. However, there may be good cause for suppressing evidence
1. The Govenment may take an appeal
from a decision or order of a district courts suppressing or excluding evidence . . . in a crimi-
nal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict
or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the
district court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is a
substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988) (emphasis added). Jeopardy attaches during a jury trial when the jury is
sworn, see Crist v. Brest, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978), and during a bench trial when the first witness
is sworn, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
2. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 129-30 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
671 (1896) (dictum). It should be noted that three out of the nine justices in Kepner disagreed with
the rule prohibiting appeals following acquittals. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Holmes argued
that a defendant can be put in jeopardy only once for each criminal cause of action and that a reversal
of an acquittal following appeal merely extended the original jeopardy into the second trial. See 195
U.S. at 134-37.
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in mid-trial, rather than beforehand. New evidence might be found after
the trial begins,' or the resolution of the suppression matter may not be
separable from the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." In
addition, there are numerous evidentiary issues of relevance, prejudice,
and hearsay that clearly cannot be anticipated or resolved before the start
of testimony at trial. One cannot ignore evidence merely because it must
be evaluated after jeopardy attaches.
All the same, the Government's inability to appeal adverse rulings is
cause for distress. Without any safety net in which to catch judicial error,
society's interest in law enforcement is greatly compromised. The commu-
nity incurs an incalculable expense when the vast machinery constructed
to bring criminals to justice can be felled by the simple error of a single
unreviewable judge.
Furthermore, the problem of the unreviewable judge is becoming in-
creasingly significant in the Federal system. In an era when the energies
of Government law enforcement agencies are focused on more complex
crimes, the cost of unreviewable judgments increases. In the past ten
years, the offices of the United States attorney have focused on a greater
number of white-collar crimes. Criminal investigations of public corrup-
tion5 and fraud,' for example, often employ many more human and finan-
cial resources than the more traditional violent and narcotics-related in-
quiries. As former United States Attorney Robert Fiske noted, "there has
been a reluctance on the part of many investigators and prosecutors to get
deeply involved in white-collar crime investigations because they are diffi-
cult, require far greater resources, and result in far fewer cases-fewer
statistics-in proportion to the effort expended." 7 The increased emphasis
on these high profile investigations is thought to be justified by the belief
that the deterrence value of conviction is great, and that the social and
economic costs8 incurred by these crimes are devastatingly high. Given the
3. See FED. R. GRIM. P. 12(f) (motion to suppress must be made before trial unless cause exists
for its deferral).
4. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (motion to dismiss may be entertained before trial only if deter-
mination of motion can be made without trial of general issue).
5. In 1975, 53 indictments were issued charging offenses dealing with the abuse of public office.
In 1985, 563 indictments were filed, an increase of 1062%. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 371 (1985).
6. For the same 10 year period, the increase in fraud cases filed in the federal district courts rose
180%, from 3958 to 7109. In 1985, fraud cases amounted to 15% of all federal criminal prosecutions.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE U.S. COURTS 30, 48, X-1-33
(1985).
7. Fiske, Foreword, 18 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 166 (1980).
8. The Joint Economic Committee of Congress estimated that the cost of white-collar crime in the
United States during 1976 exceeded $44 billion a year, as compared to the $4 billion loss that is
estimated to result from crimes against property. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 10 &
n.20 (Comm. Print 1978). The $44 billion figure does not represent the estimated $25 billion a year
lost due to fraud against government programs. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S. GOV'T, GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN, AND SHOULD, Do MORE TO COMBAT FRAUD IN
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 7 (1978).
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already limited number of white-collar investigations, the blow delivered
by an erroneous and unreviewable ruling to the long-term strategic poli-
cies of law enforcement can be crippling.
The social cost resulting from the prosecution's inability to appeal may
also express itself in a demoralizing effect on law enforcement agencies.
Perhaps nothing is more frustrating to individuals in law enforcement
than the nullification of their efforts by erroneous rulings. A large number
of prosecutors, agents, and administrative staff may be involved for their
entire public service career on a single case. A working environment in
which their efforts are mobilized in vain may well foster cynicism.9
The Federal response to the problem of the unreviewable judge has
taken two routes. One circuit court has laid down guidelines specifying
which evidentiary issues must be decided before trial begins and which
may be deferred." At least two district courts have attempted to solve the
Government's dilemma by developing a procedural device that converts
unappealable mid-trial rulings into appealable pre-trial ones through the
grant of a mistrial." This Note will examine the efficacy and constitu-
tionality of these solutions. It will be argued that although these attempts
are not the most effective, they are helpful in pointing a way to a better
solution. An optimal solution would not only allow the review of eviden-
tiary rulings entered during trial, but also would protect the defendant
against possible abuse by the prosecution. A survey of the historical devel-
opment of Government appeals in the Federal system will be useful in
placing the problem in context. Against this background, it will be seen
that the proposed solution to the problem of the unreviewable judge is the
natural extension of the legislative project concerning Government appeals
in criminal cases.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Common Law Rule and Its Discontents
The history of the Government's right to appeal in criminal cases has
been very kind to the unreviewable judge. The English Common Law
rule prior to 1700 stated that neither the prosecution nor the defense had
the right to appeal in criminal cases. A writ of error was granted only* as
a matter of grace from the Crown.12 Thereafter, the prosecution and de-
fendant were permitted to seek review as of right when there was proba-
ble error, but no writ of error was to be had from a verdict of conviction. 3
9. See Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 512 (1927).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 38-42.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50.
12. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 339-340 (1770).
13. See id.; J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 171 (2d ed.
1890).
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The defendant had no right to challenge the fact-findings of the jury and
the only recourse was to apply to the Crown through the Secretary of
State for the Home Department for a pardon.1'
In the Federal courts, defendants were given in 1891 the statutory
right to apply for writs of error in most instances."6 However, the Gov-
ernment was granted no corresponding right. The Supreme Court held in
United States v. Sanges'7 that, without legislative authority, the Govern-
ment did not have the right to appeal in criminal cases. The Court rea-
soned that "the defendant, having been once put upon his trial and dis-
charged by the court, is not to be again vexed for the same cause, unless
the legislature, acting within its constitutional authority, has made express
provision for a review of the judgment at the instance of the
government."' 8
Sanges was decided in 1892. The Court's holding in that case prompted
the United States Attorney General to issue the first recommendation re-
questing that Congress grant the Government the right to appeal in crimi-
nal cases. Attorney General Miller's main concern was the unbridled
power of the district judge: "As the law now stands, therefore, it is in the
power of the single district judge. . . to defeat any criminal prosecution
instituted by the Government, . . . and there is no possible remedy or
way to right the wrong."' 9 This plea was echoed by each successive Attor-
ney General for the next fourteen years.2
Congress was alerted to this problem following the debacle of the 1906
Beef Trust Case.2 In this action, the defendant was charged with conspir-
ing in restraint of trade and with an attempt to monopolize, in violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. After months of extensive investiga-
tion by the Department of Justice and a Federal grand jury, the district
14. See J. STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 172.
15. Among state jurisdictions, there existed little consensus on the issue of appealability in crimi-
nal cases. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1637 (1887) and State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 265-69, 30 A.
1110, 1110-13 (1894) (prosecution permitted to appeal all matters of law arising from criminal ac-
tion, even after acquittal, and double jeopardy did not bar retrial following reversal) with State v.
McGrorty, 2 Minn. 224 (1858) (state not permitted to seek review of any matter of fact or law in
criminal case, whether during or before trial, even though trial judge had certified point to higher
court and defendant consented).
The Supreme Court initially held that the double jeopardy provision did not bind the states. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937). The Court later overruled this decision and held that
the double jeopardy clause was to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
16. In 1889, defendants were permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court only in capital cases. Act
of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656-57. This right was expanded in 1891, allowing defendants
a writ of error in any case involving statutory construction or constitutional validity. Judiciary Act of
1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 828.
17. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
18. Id. at 318.
19. 1892 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xxiv-xxv.
20. See 1893 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xxvi; 1899 A7T'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 33; 1900 ATT'y GEN.
ANN. REP. 40; 1903 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. vi; 1905 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 10-11; 1906 Arr'y
GEN. ANN. REP. 4-5.
21. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906).
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judge directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the trial because
he was of the opinion that the inculpatory evidence used by the prosecu-
tion violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation.2' The buck stopped at the district court-no appeal was available.
Government frustration was felt all the way at the top. During his an-.
nual message to Congress in 1907, Theodore Roosevelt expressed his dis-
appointment with the existing state of appellate jurisdiction:
It seems an absurdity to permit a single district judge, against what
may be the judgment of the immense majority of his or her col-
leagues on the bench, to declare a law solemnly enacted by the Con-
gress to be "unconstitutional," and then to deny the Government the
right to have the Supreme Court definitely decide the question.23
B. The Development of the Statutory Scheme
Roosevelt was not the only Federal offical concerned. The House of
Representatives had already drafted a statute that allowed the Govern-
ment the right to appeal in all cases, except where a judgment had been
entered in favor of the defendant.2 ' When the bill reached the Senate,
however, the Judiciary Committee substantially reworked it, allowing ap-
peals in only very limited circumstances.25 That the bill even survived the
floor debate was quite miraculous given the hostility that many Senators
felt towards any government appeals."
When the revised bill was sent back to the House, many Representa-
tives were furious over the senatorial butchering it had suffered. Con-
gressman Jenkins, one of the House bill's chief sponsors, bitterly quipped
that he thought a criminal could not have done a better job drafting the
statute. A secret conference between the House and Senate followed,
during which the Senate bill was marginally revised to allow direct review
to the Supreme Court-a concession to the House supporters. The new
22. Id. at 822.
23. 41 CONG. REC. 22 (1906).
24. H.R. 15434, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 40 CONG. REc. 5408 (1906).
25. Appeals were provided only in the following instances: (1) from a decision quashing, setting
aside, or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment; (2) from a decision arresting judgment of a convic-
tion based on the insufficiency of the indictment; and (3) from a decision sustaining a special plea in
bar when the defendant had not been placed in jeopardy. See S. REP. No. 3922, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1906).
26. See, e.g., 41 CONG. REc. 2191-92 (1907). The Senate eventually approved the Judiciary
Committee's bill with the further limitations that (1) right to review be restricted to questions of
statutory construction and constitutional invalidity; and (2) the provision for direct review to the Su-
preme Court be eliminated. Id. at 2825.
27. Id. at 3044.
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bill passed in both houses of Congress soon after the meeting,28 and was
signed into law as the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907.9
As one would expect, the Criminal Appeals Act had little effect on the
unreviewable judge. The Government still had no right to appeal an ad-
verse evidentiary matter made either before or during trial. In addition, if
the ruling was made after jeopardy attached, the decision of a district
court judge to quash an indictment based on its unconstitutionality or stat-
utory construction was also insulated from appeal."0
It took Congress another 60 years to act decisively.31 In 1968, as part of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,32 18 U.S.C. § 3731 was
finally amended to allow the Government to appeal pre-trial evidentiary
suppression orders. Mid-trial evidentiary appeals, though, were expressly
denied.3 This expansion of the Government's rights was intended to com-
bat the broad grant of protection afforded the defendant by the Warren
Court in the years preceding. Many politicians felt that the liberal Fed-
eral district courts had lost their sense of proportion with regard to the
suppression of evidence and that their excesses might be curbed by al-
lowing the prosecution to seek appellate review. 4 The trend continued
28. Id. at 3994, 4128.
29. The Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1988)).
30. A telling illustration of the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Appeals Act in dealing with judicial
unreviewability is the dilemma the Supreme Court faced in United States v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377
(1924). In Weissman, the district court had quashed the indictment immediately after the jury was
impaneled, even before opening statements were delivered. The district court then directed a verdict
for the defendant. Id. at 378. The Government appealed, claiming that the trial judge intentionally
manipulated the procedure by waiting to quash only after the defendant was placed in jeopardy, in
order to insulate the interlocutory ruling from appellate review. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Holmes recognized that the actions of the judge were suspect but nevertheless held that "such consid-
erations do not affect the construction of the act." Id. at 379. The legal insufficiency of the indictment
could not be tested on review. Thus, while the Court recognized that the district judge should not have
done what he did, the Court also affirmed that he could do what he did.
31. Congress had half-heartedly addressed the problem in the past, but its efforts met with little
success. In 1942, the Criminal Appeals Act was amended, Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat. 271,
to allow appeals from decisions quashing indictments or arresting judgments where the basis of the
ruling was other than statutory construction or constitutional validity. Like its 1907 progenitor, the
1942 amendment did little to alter the unreviewable status of judicial rulings. As before, any decision
issued after the jury was impaneled was unreviewable. With regard to pre-trial evidentiary rulings,
the situation was improved somewhat. A pre-trial suppression order was appealable if the district
court characterized its order as a dismissal based on illegal evidence. See United States v. Ashby, 245
F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1957). However, if the trial judge labeled his ruling as a dismissal based on
insufficient evidence, then appeal was not covered by the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. See United
States v. Janitz, 161 F.2d 19, 21 (3d Cir. 1947). The mistaken judge would thus escape scrutiny if he
happened to characterize the dismissal in a certain way.
32. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1301, 82 Stat. 237 (1968).
33. This opened up the possibility that the defendant could defeat the government's right to ap-
peal by saving an evidentiary objection until jeopardy attached. Such delays, though, were generally
treated as untimely. See United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Barber, 495 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1974); see also 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2195
("Care must be exercised to avoid having a defendant defeat the right of appeal ... by waiting until
trial."). This loophole was formally closed in 1975 when Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to provide that failure to move for a suppression motion before trial without
just cause is to be considered a waiver of the right to object. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e), (0.
34. Consider the statement of Representative Poff during the bill's debate:
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and, two years later, Congress granted the Government the right to appeal
dismissals in all cases not barred by the double jeopardy clause.35
As we have seen, the expansion of the Government's right to appeal in
criminal cases historically has been motivated by the desire to constrain
the power of the district judge. Why then did Congress stop just short of
granting mid-trial interlocutory appeals? According to one court, "the
only evident purpose in establishing the limited exception as to orders en-
tered during trial was to prevent the suspension or interruption of ongoing
trials."38 Such a policy is obviously sound-one could not expect the jury's
(or, for that matter, the trial judge's) memory to remain fresh while op-
posing counsel prepared briefs and argued before a court of appeals. Ap-
peals pursued in the middle of a criminal trial are unacceptable because
they destroy the trial's delicate continuity.
II. THE SOLUTIONS
The availability of pre-trial appeals under section 3731 indicates that
the need to fetter the district court can often be harmonized with the need
to preserve trial continuity. When both policies can be accommodated, the
Government's right to appeal ought to be protected. One can thus imagine
two situations where the Government should have recourse when faced
with potentially unappealable mid-trial orders. First, the prosecution
might appeal the district court's decision to postpone the evidentiary deci-
sion until the trial rather than ruling before trial. Second, one could de-
velop some means of converting mid-trial orders into pre-trial ones
through a grant of a mistrial. We shall see that the above suggestions not
only reflect sound policy but also enjoy support in Federal case law.
At the present time, the prosecution of many significant cases in the Federal courts is thwarted
because of the holding of a single district judge that a confession or admission has been unlaw-
fully obtained or that the identification of a defendant by his victim or by an eyewitness to the
crime was unlawful. By authorizing an appeal in such cases, and thereby allowing an appel-
late court to determine whether the decision of the district judge suppressing the evidence is in
accord with the existing law, title VIII may enable many of these prosecutions to be saved.
114 CONG. REC. 16278-79 (1968).
35. Ominbus Crime Control Act of 1970 (Criminal Appeals Act), Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14(a),
84 Stat 1881, 1890 (1971). Roughly, appeals are constitutionally invalid when the dismissals are
based on the trial judge's determination that the defendant is not guilty based on the factual merits of
the case. If the dismissal is based on a legal theory, i.e., a judgment that no criminal violation had
occurred even if the facts set out in the indictment were true, then that order is appealable, regardless
of when the ruling by the trial judge was made. This Note will not deal with dismissals because those
situations do not raise unreviewability problems. An erroneous ruling on a matter of law which re-
sults in a dismissal will be appealable. See Note, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal
Cases, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1837-41 (1977).
36. United States v. Beck, 483 F.2d 203, 205 (3rd Cir. 1973) (interpreting vague legislative intent
set out in S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969)).
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A. Forcing the Pre-Trial Ruling
The Government is usually permitted to secure an evidentiary ruling
before trial.17 However, for obvious reasons, the Government cannot de-
mand one as a matter of right. Evidentiary matters are by their very na-
ture holistic. Questions of admissibility are usually predicated on a back-
ground of interwoven fact patterns, and the facts set out in the record,
either in the indictment or affidavits accompanying the motion, are often
insufficient to permit an informed decision. To rule on issues of illegality,
the trial judge may need to hear from Government officials concerning the
particulars of their past investigations and the determination of prejudice
may necessitate that the judge acquire a "feel" for the case. To hold a
mini-trial in order to decide an evidentiary matter may cause great delay
for the defendant and contribute to court inefficiency.
Nevertheless, if the Government's right to appeal is worth protecting,
deferral decisions cannot be left solely in the discretion of the trial court.
The need for such a guiding rule was first perceived by the First Circuit
in United States v. Barletta.8 In Barletta, the defendant requested an
evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of certain taped conversations be-
tween himself and a Government informant. With the consent of the two
parties, the trial judge waited until the trial began and then ruled to ex-
clude the tapes, basing the decision on their prejudicial nature and lack of
probative value. After a mistrial was declared due to a hung jury, the
Government sought a pre-trial reconsideration of the exclusion ruling.
The district court denied the motion on the ground that an informed deci-
sion had to await retrial. 9
The Government appealed the district court's deferral, claiming that
the court had no good reason for awaiting trial and that without a pre-
trial ruling, an appeal on the merits would be unavailable pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3731. The First Circuit agreed and set forth the following rule:
"[A] district court must rule on any issue entirely segregable from the
evidence to be presented at trial, but may in its discretion defer a ruling
on any motion that requires trial of any non-trivial part of the 'general
issue' .. .""o The court accordingly distinguished three types of eviden-
tiary motions based on the degree of probative complexity. The first class
consists of questions that would require a virtual mini-trial for their de-
termination, such as the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay. The mo-
tions in this class must be deferred. The second class involves issues that
overlap with evidence relating to the general issue to be presented at trial.
In such cases, it is in the district court's discretion whether or not to defer.
37. See United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 1976) (district court may entertain
motion to suppress at Government's request).
38. 644 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1981).
39. United States v. Barletta, 492 F. Supp. 910, 912-14 (D. Mass. 1980).
40. 644 F.2d at 57-58.
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The third class is made up of motions that can be decided with little or no
presentation of the evidence pertaining to the general issue. Situations re-
quiring such de minimis review must be decided before trial."' The
Barletta court held that the motion under review fell into the third cate-
gory. Since a trial had already occurred and the district court had heard
all the relevant evidence, no additional evidence needed to be presented
before trial in order to decide the motion. The court found the deferral
motion improper and reversed the district court, instructing it to rule on
the evidentiary matter before the trial began.42
The Barletta ruling holds great significance for the issue of judicial
unreviewability. It is here that one may first discern the willingness of an
appellate court to protect the Government's need to appeal against the
district court's normally overriding power. The Barletta holding con-
strains the trial judge from deferring evidentiary rulings that can effi-
ciently be addressed before trial. Further, it endows the court of appeals
with corrective authority to reverse such judicial errors.
However, the advances won by the Barletta rule may in fact be more
theoretical than practical. As mentioned above, evidentiary issues often re-
sist de minimis consideration. To be sure, there will be a wide range of
matters that cannot be handled as easily before trial as were the issues in
Barletta. In Barletta, the evidence had already been introduced during
the previous trial. There was thus no need for a pre-trial evidentiary
hearing. In addition, even if the prosecution could receive all the pre-trial
rulings it wanted, this right would be of little use in situations where
evidence was uncovered after trial began. By itself, the Barletta rule can-
not be the exclusive remedy for the prosecutor facing the unreviewable
judge. A more comprehensive solution is required.
B. Mid-trial Rulings and the Possibility of Appeal
It is particularly interesting to see how unreviewable judges who wish
to be reviewable have dealt with the Government's predicament. If a trial
judge wishes to preserve the Government's right to appeal but must wait
to rule until the middle of trial, he has two alternatives. The first choice is
to strike a bargain with the defendant. The judge will consider the motion
only if the defendant waives his double jeopardy rights with regard to the
evidentiary matter. This approach was used by the district court in United
States v. Kington.43 In Kington, the defendant moved for a pre-trial sup-
pression hearing, but the judge decided the motion only after the jury was
empaneled. Without the Government's prompting, the trial judge pro-
posed the following compromise: If the defendant agreed to waive his
41. Id. at 58.
42. Id. at 59-60.
43. 801 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1986).
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double jeopardy rights, the jury would be discharged in order for the Gov-
ernment to seek an appeal, and, following appeal, former jeopardy would
not bar retrial. If the defendant refused, the motion would not be consid-
ered. The defendant chose to waive his double jeopardy rights. Accord-
ingly, the jury was discharged, and upon appeal the court of appeals re-
versed the district court's evidentiary ruling. The defendant then
challenged the district court's compromise, claiming that former jeopardy
barred retrial.
The Fifth Circuit held the reprosecution and appeal to be proper. It
reasoned that former jeopardy did not act as a bar because the defendant
had explicitly waived his double jeopardy rights at trial."" It further held
that the appeal did not violate the congressional sanction against mid-trial
appeals because the appeal itself did not interrupt the ongoing trial.
Rather, the trial terminated because the district court ruled that a mistrial
was required and thus the post-trial appeal did not run afoul of section
3731.'5
The second possibility is for the trial judge to declare a mistrial and
rule on the evidentiary issue before retrial so that the Government can
petition for an appeal. This approach was validated by the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Moon." In Moon, the defendant moved for a ruling on
an evidentiary matter after the jury was sworn in, whereupon the trial
judge suppressed a large portion of the Government's evidence. The trial
judge granted the Government's motion for a mistrial but cautioned the
Government that subsequent prosecution might be barred by former jeop-
ardy.47 Upon reindictment, the district court ruled that former jeopardy
barred retrial. 48 The Government appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed
the dismissal, claiming that the trial judge's consideration of defendant's
evidentiary motion after jeopardy had attached wrongly denied the Gov-
ernment its right to appeal. 4' The mistrial was therefore proper and did
not bar reprosecution.50
C. The Proposed Solution
The cases set out above demonstrate that there are ways for a district
court to protect the Government's interest in securing an appeal on evi-
44. Id. at 735.
45. Id. at 735-36.
46. 491 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 1049.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1049-50.
50. The district court's approach in Moon is similar to that taken by Illinois state courts when
dealing with interlocutory appeals brought by the prosecution during trial. If the defendant has good
cause to raise an evidentiary matter after he has been put in jeopardy, the judge must grant a mistrial
if the state requests one. If the trial court does not grant a mistrial, the appeals court will direct the
trial court to do so on review. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12(c) (Smith-Hurd 1977 &
Supp. 1988); People v. Hoban, 57 Ill. App. 3d 25, 27-28, 372 N.E.2d 976, 977 (1978).
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dentiary matters decided during trial. However, a district judge who does
not choose to accommodate the Government creates great difficulties for
the prosecution. A possible solution would be to require the district court
to present the defendant with an ultimatum whenever it appears that the
Government will not be able to appeal an adverse ruling. If the court
determines that good cause exists to entertain the defendant's evidentiary
motion during trial, the Government would have the right to make the
defendant either choose a mistrial and waiver of his double jeopardy
rights or allow the court to rule in the Government's favor.
In this way, the Government can protect itself from the dangers of un-
reviewable orders. For if the defendant chooses the mistrial option, the
prosecution could appeal the ruling as a pre-retrial interlocutory appeal
under section 3731, and retrial would not be barred. Alternatively, if the
defendant were content to continue the trial with his motion denied, the
prosecution would have no reason to seek appeal. The failure of the dis-
trict court to make the defendant choose would itself be an appealable
issue, subject to reversal and remand by the court of appeals.
Such a motion would be structurally different from the procedural de-
vices used by the district courts in Kington and Moon. Unlike the Kington
compromise where power resided solely with the trial judge, the Govern-
ment would have the right to demand that the defendant choose. The pro-
posed motion also would differ from the Moon order by allowing the de-
fendant to elect a mistrial rather than forcing it upon him.
In addition, the above motion would be supplemented with two sub-
stantive restrictions. First, only the suppression of material evidence
would be reviewed. By requiring that the district court make a finding of
materiality, the proposal would ensure that not every evidentiary ruling
will be sufficient to force the defendant to make this difficult choice. Sec-
ond, just as section 3731 requires a certification regarding pre-trial ap-
peals, it would also be necessary that the United States attorney for the
district review the case and certify that the proposed motion is not
designed to cause delay or to gain an unfair advantage.5" As will be
shown, the motion described above is a significant improvement over the
Kington and Moon prototypes in protecting the defendant against
prosecutorial abuse. 2
D. Doubts Concerning the Proposed Solution
Since section 3731 does not permit appeals after jeopardy attaches, the
proposal seeks to maximize the Government's right to appeal pre-trial
rulings. The proposal is consistent with the congressional grant of appel-
51. One might also require that such appeals be given priority on the appellate docket. See, e.g.,
HAw. REv. STAT. § 641-13(7), (8) (1988).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76 & note 76.
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late rights for it does not sanction mid-trial review but only the review of
mid-trial orders that, in a more perfect world, would have been made
before trial began. However, the proposal may appear to be a subtle cir-
cumvention of congressional authority. Courts have often been wary of
judicial expansion of the Government's right to appeal in criminal cases,53
and simply because a procedure is consistent with an existing statute does
not indicate that it has legislative approval. Furthermore, the question
concerning judicial authority is moot if the forced election of the defendant
is found to be constitutionally invalid. In this respect, it is far from obvi-
ous that the above proposal is consistent with the double jeopardy clause
since the defendant may be forced to waive his rights to refuse
reprosecution.
Fortunately, one issue bleeds into the other for, as we will see, former
jeopardy does not bar reprosecution following certain types of mistrials
because trial courts are under a duty to declare them. 4 If the problem of
the unreviewable judge falls under the mistrial exception to the double
jeopardy clause, it does so because it is a problem that, like many others,
trial courts are charged with solving. Thus, when the proposal is viewed
not as surreptitiously expanding the Government's substantive rights to
appeal but rather as isolating an instance of required mistrial, it will be
apparent that the proposal is not only constitutional but also fit for judi-
cial creation.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SOLUTION
A. An Objection to the Solution
A constitutional objection that the above proposal violates the double
jeopardy clause should not be understood as attacking the proposal for
explicitly eliminating the defendant's rights not to be tried twice. This
objection would not be well-founded, because the defendant is given a
choice between a mistrial and foregoing the evidentiary victory. Rather,
one could reasonably complain that the choice functionally reduces the
double jeopardy guarantee to a hollow entitlement. A choice between pre-
serving one's right to complete the first trial and another right to suppress
evidence that ought to be suppressed is a choice between two unsatisfac-
tory options. The worth of either of the disjunctive rights has thus been
significantly diminished.
The reply to this challenge cannot be answered before analyzing the
policies underlying the double jeopardy provision. Whether the proposed
solution to the unreviewable judge is unconstitutional will depend on
whether the rationale behind double jeopardy is found to be compromised.
53. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245-46 (1981); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S.
394, 400 (1957); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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B. Rationale Behind the Double Jeopardy Protection
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life or
limb."55 In Green v. United States, 6 the Court neatly summarized the
policies underlying this Fifth Amendment provision:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby [1] subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and [2] compelling him to live in a
constant state of anxiety and insecurity as well as [3] enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.57
The first justification behind the double jeopardy provision is that plac-
ing a presumptively innocent person on trial causes that person great em-
barrassment and expense. If the Government, which has vastly greater
resources than the average defendant, is allowed to prosecute the defend-
ant repeatedly even after an acquittal, the defendant will be unfairly
harassed and worn down emotionally and financially. Therefore, the Gov-
ernment should be allowed only one chance at each conviction.
The second policy announced in Green is closely related to the first:
Once a trial has begun in which the defendant's future is uncertain, the
defendant has a strong interest in seeing that his case is settled conclu-
sively. To endure both the trauma of a trial and the risk of reversal of a
favorable verdict on appeal is too emotionally taxing for a defendant to
bear.58
While the policies of limiting harassment and uncertainty are certainly
noble, they play a limited role in the mechanics of the double jeopardy
protection. Retrial is permitted in many instances, even though the de-
fendant is subject to great harassment and anxiety. It has long been recog-
nized that retrial following a mistrial is proper when there exists a "man-
ifest necessity' 59 for the declaration of a inistrial and the aims of public
justice will thus be served. In the classic example of manifest necessity, a
mistrial resulting from a hung jury is retriable.60 Reprosecution is also
permitted after a reversal of a conviction on appeal."' In other cases, a
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. For an excellent discussion of the history of the double jeopardy
protection throughout the ages, see generally J. SIGLIER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
56. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
57. Id. at 187-88.
58. This policy is often described in terms of "the defendant's valued right to have his trial com-
pleted by a particular tribunal." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
59. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
60. Id. at 580.
61. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
15-17 (1978) (limiting Ball rule to reversals not based on insufficiency of evidence at trial).
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second trial is considered proper after a jury acquittal when the first trial
occurred in a court without jurisdiction.62 The dual sovereignty doctrine
allows a Federal prosecution after a state acquittal for the same offense
(and vice versa). 63
These examples of reprosecution following a first trial demonstrate that
the public's interest in the fair administration of the criminal process often
outweighs the defendant's interest in limiting his personal expense and
uncertainty. The above two considerations act as a bar to a second trial
when the public good served by terminating the first trial is minimal.
Therefore, mistrials are improper when the prosecution believes that the
jury may not convict, or when it uses the first trial as a dry run in order
to rehearse its case. " Prosecutorial conduct designed to oppress the ac-
cused will likewise bar retrial.65 It is because a criminal trial is a life-
altering event for the defendant that the law demands adequate justifica-
tion for a second go-around.
The third policy underlying double jeopardy protection reflects the dif-
ferent concern that a second fact-finding increases the probability of an
unjust conviction. That the exposure to this risk is considered so unjusti-
fied by Federal courts is evidenced by the doctrine that an acquittal will
stand even in the face of an egregiously erroneous ruling by the trial
judge.66 This policy, by its very nature, is only applicable when a fact-
finding has taken place. An acquittal, which is a fact-finding relating to
the general issue of guilt or innocence, is therefore never appealable. Simi-
larly, the third policy will bar appeals of dismissals when the insufficiency
of an indictment is predicated on a fact-finding going to the defendant's
culpability. Mistrials, on the other hand, do not result in any fact-finding;
they are trials that are aborted in the middle. Retrying a defendant fol-
lowing a mistrial thus does not increase the risk of unjust conviction. 7
C. Manifest Necessity and the Unreviewability of Judges
Since the proposed solution employs the grant of a mistrial to preserve
the Government's right to appeal, retrial will be proper only if the societal
interest outweighs the defendant's interest. The test of manifest necessity
62. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 669 (dictum); Johnsen v. United States, 41 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864 (1930).
63. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137
(1959).
64. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508 (1978).
65. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1982).
66. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (double jeopardy bars appeal even
though district court directed verdict for defendant before Government concluded its case-in-chie).
67. It has been argued that the real policy behind double jeopardy is the preservation of the jury's
prerogative to acquit against the weight of the evidence. See Westen, The Three Faces of Double
Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. Rav. 1001,
1021-23 (1980). Since this policy is applicable only in situations where there has been a fact-finding,
it also does not apply to mistrial cases.
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is designed to set this limit. As Justice Story, the originator of this doc-
trine, explained in connection with hung juries,
[T]he law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to dis-
charge any jury from giving a verdict, whenever, in their opinion,
taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. Courts are to exercise sound discretion on the subject; and
it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it
proper to interfere. . . . But, after all, they have the right to order
the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful,
sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion,- rests, in this, as
in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their
oath of office."8
This standard has also justified mistrials based on jury bias, 9 defective
indictments,70 trial judge illness, 1 "acts of God" such as war, 7 and de-
fense counsel misbehavior which prejudices the prosecution's case.3
But the manifest necessity test does not only define the boundaries of
double jeopardy. It also imposes an affirmative duty on the district courts
to discharge a jury when the aims of public justice require it. The trial
judge must ensure that the accused is tried in a fair proceeding which is
designed to end in a just judgement. When the integrity of the trial is
compromised and uncorrectable, the district judge should declare a
mistrial.
It has been argued throughout this Note that protecting the Govern-
ment's right to appeal damaging adverse rulings is also necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of the criminal process. Without a method for trapping
error, society is cheated out of a just trial. The functional similarity be-
tween defense counsel misconduct that damages the prosecutor's case and
a judge's erroneous ruling that excludes the Government's chief evidence
is too close to be ignored. In both instances termination of the first trial
furthers the societal interest of justice.
The district court is therefore obligated to do something in order to
solve this problem. But the answer cannot lie in the declaration of a mis-
trial whenever the defendant objects to Government evidence during trial.
The reason is that not all evidentiary rulings need to be appealed-only
important and potentially erroneous ones require review. Preserving the
Government's right to appeal cannot always be a claim of manifest neces-
68. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
69. See Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894); Simmons v. United States, 142
U.S. 148, 154 (1893).
70. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1973).
71. See Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815, 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
72. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1949).
73. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978).
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sity, because the matter may not be important enough to appeal. How are
we to know which evidentiary rulings are important to appeal and which
are not? Clearly the prosecution cannot be assumed to be a fair judge as
to the worth of the appeal. In contrast to the defendant, the prosecution
may have little to lose by requesting a mistrial. Alternatively, the prosecu-
tion may wish to be released from the first trial because it believes that it
has performed poorly and desires a second chance. The trial judge is also
a poor guide, because she is ihe one that is ruling in favor of one of the
parties. It would be beyond the scope of her powers to ask a judge to
evaluate the fallibility of her own decisions.
The solution is to let the defendant decide the importance of appeal by
having him choose whether to acquiesce to a mistrial. If the defendant
believes that his evidentiary position has little merit, he will probably not
opt for a mistrial. For if his contention is frivolous, the evidentiary ruling
will be reversed on appeal and he will have to suffer through another trial
with nothing gained. Or he may believe that the inculpatory evidence
ought to be suppressed and therefore will opt for a mistrial-for if he
decides to go forward with the trial and is convicted, his conviction might
be overturned on appeal and he will be retried anyway. Since the decision
is made by the interested party, the only matters that will be appealed
through the grant of a mistrial will be those about which there exists
serious disagreement.
Efficiency is not the only virtue of the defendant's deliberation and
choice. Since it is the defendant who might be retried it is only fair that he
should choose whether to incur this additional expense or continue with a
somewhat injured trial position. The double jeopardy provision is meant
to minimize the harassment of the defendant and its ends are best served
by allowing the defendant to decide how much harassment he is willing to
endure. Forced election, then, seeks to enhance the defendant's autonomy
in connection with major trial decisions.
The solution proposed in this Note partly restores parity between the
prosecution and defendant by using a variant of the "I cut, you choose"
game strategy.74 Allowing the prosecution to make the initial motion not
only creates the possibility of appeal but also ensures that the defendant
cannot use the solution to escape from a bad trial position. Permitting the
defendant the final choice guarantees that the prosecution's mistrial at-
tempt will not be frivolous or deviously strategic. Since each party is given
control over the grant of mistrial, no party can abort the trial unilaterally.
This procedural fairness also achieves the socially desirable outcome: the
74. The "I cut, you choose" strategy is also known as the egalitarian solution for two-person zero-
sum games. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 363-68 (1957). The classic example
of the use of such a strategy is the situation in which two people wish to divide a pie equally. In order
to ensure fairness, one person should cut the pie and the other one should choose the portion he
desires.
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evidentiary issues that will be appealed are those that, in the eyes of both
parties, would be colorable to an appellate court.
While such a strategy can successfully eliminate unnecessary mistrials,
it cannot act as a complete safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct.
Despite the defendant's ability to defeat any mistrial attempt, she does so
at the price of losing the evidentiary ruling at the trial level. By using the
threat of mistrial as a bargaining chip, the Government can prevail on
any evidentiary issue that is not significant enough to trigger the defend-
ant's mistrial consent but nonetheless it considers relevant to the fact-
finding.
The proposed solution is supplemented with materiality and certifica-
tion requirements in order to preclude this strategic possibility. By making
the motion conditional on the materiality of the evidence75 and the United
States attorney's certification against delay, we ensure that a defendant is
not penalized for reasonably wanting to avoid a mistrial for less than the
most "weighty" of issues. The court can therefore supervise that a tech-
nique set up to establish parity is not itself used as an instrument of
abuse.7
This Note has argued that the existence of the unreviewable judge
should be sufficient to impose a duty upon the district court to require the
defendant to choose between a mistrial or continuing the trial without the
evidence suppressed. The societal interest in preserving the Government's
right to appeal raises a presumption of manifest necessity which the de-
fendant may rebut by choosing to forgo a mistrial. However, the reader
may still not be convinced that the need for Government appeals is
enough to justify such a conclusion. In reply to the skeptic it can be shown
that if other considerations that are of less merit are enough to force the
75. The materiality condition is taken from the § 3731 pre-trial provision requiring that the
United States attorney certify that the evidence sought to be admitted "is a substantial proof of a fact
material in the proceeding." Unfortunately, courts have not ruled on what consists of substantial proof
of a material fact, chiefly because the function of the certification in a pre-trial appeal is merely to
symbolize the prosecutor's good faith. Since in a mid-trial context the potential for abuse is much
higher, proclamations of good faith are inadequate safeguards. Given that the trial court must decide
what evidentiary issues will be sent up on appeal, it would seem that the only evidence that ought to
be reviewed is the evidence that, if admitted incorrectly during the trial, would be grounds for rever-
sal. Thus, the materiality standard for mid-trial appeals would follow the harmless error rule. See
generally Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) (harmless error in constitutional con-
text); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (harmless error in non-constitutional
context).
76. There does exist one other possible scenario where the proposed solution can be used as a
weapon against the defendant. In order to get a mistrial, the Government may choose to secrete
substantial inculpatory evidence and claim to have discovered such evidence if it finds that the trial is
going poorly. However, such instances will be quite rare. Given the fact that certification is required,
a prosecutor will be most hesitant to defraud a Federal district court. In addition, only the most
foolish of Federal district judges would accept a prosecutor's word that substantial evidence has been
found after trial has begun and still believe that the prosecutor was willing to go to trial without the
evidence in the first place. Fortuitous circumstances that allow a party to secure a mistrial when they
desperately need it would clearly be suspect.
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accused to choose a mistrial, then a fortiori the unreviewability of judges
should also be sufficient to justify a similar election.
D. Mistrials at the Request of the Defendant and the Forced Election
There are two varieties of mistrials. Mistrials based on manifest neces-
sity are those granted by the district court over the objection of the defend-
ant. In such a situation, the defendant does not want to end the first trial
but the trial judge determines that justice requires that it be terminated.
However, when the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no require-
ment of manifest necessity because the defendant himself has struck the
double jeopardy balance for the court. The defendant elects to submit to
the harassment of a second trial because he believes that to continue with
the first trial would do more harm than good."
In order to best illustrate the constitutional logic of defendant-motivated
mistrials, it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Dinitz."8 The trial judge in Dinitz dismissed the defense counsel
due to his incorrigible behavior during trial. The judge then presented the
defendant with the following choices: to stay the trial pending appeal of
the dismissal, to obtain a continuance to find new counsel, or to request a
mistrial. The defendant opted for the third alternative. Subsequent to the
grant of the mistrial, the defendant sought a dismissal of the new indict-
ment, pleading former jeopardy. The district court granted the dismissal
and the court of appeals affirmed. 9 The appeals court reasoned that the
defendant's request for mistrial did not act as a waiver of his double jeop-
ardy rights because the three alternatives presented to him had been un-
satisfactory. The defendant did not want to continue with the prejudicial
atmosphere of the trial nor did he want to submit to a second trial.80 A
waiver of a constitutional right must be voluntary,"' and the existence of
this "Hobson's Choice" effectively eliminated the element of voluntariness
from the defendant's selection.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the waiver theory of the court of
appeals. As the Court explained:
[I]t is evident that when judicial or prosecutorial error seriously
prejudices a defendant, he may have little interest in completing the
trial and obtaining a verdict from the first jury. The defendant may
reasonably conclude that a continuation of the tainted proceeding
would result in a conviction followed by a lengthy appeal and, if a
reversal is secured, by a second prosecution. In such circumstances, a
77. See Holleman, Mistrials and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 14 GA. L. REV. 45, 68-72 (1979).
78. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
79. See United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 59.
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel must be
voluntarily and intelligently made).
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defendant's mistrial request has objectives not unlike the interests
served by the Double Jeopardy clause-the avoidance of the anxiety,
expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions.8 2
The holding in Dinitz permits the defendant to apply the manifest ne-
cessity test for the district court. Mistrials requested or consented to by the
defendant do not bar reprosecution because the ends of double jeopardy
are served by the grant of a mistrial. Since society is unwilling to allow
every prejudicial mishap to end permanently a prosecution, the defendant
must make a choice between two unappealing alternatives. This forced
election nevertheless allows the defendant to choose between the lesser of
the two evils.
Are the ends of double jeopardy also served when the defendant is
forced to choose a mistrial not only due to defense counsel misconduct but
also because of prosecutorial overreaching? The Court confronted this
question in Oregon v. Kennedy83 and answered in the affirmative. In
Kennedy, during cross-examination, the prosecutor called the defendant
"a crook" in front of the jury. The defendant then moved for a mistrial
and the court granted the request. When the state later sought to retry,
the defendant pleaded former jeopardy. At the pre-trial hearing, the trial
court found the prosecutor did not intend to cause a mistrial and therefore
ruled that a second trial was proper."'
Following conviction, the Oregon Supreme Court sustained the double
jeopardy challenge. It held that even though there was no improper intent
on behalf of the prosecution, its actions constituted "overreaching."8 5 This
overreaching placed the defendant in an unsatisfactory position where his
essentially forced request for a mistrial could not be considered a waiver
of his double jeopardy rights. In this instance, the prosecutor's action cre-
ated a true "Hobson's Choice - either to accept a necessarily prejudiced
jury, or to move for a mistrial and face the process of being retried at a
later time."8"
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that the chance of
prosecutorial overreaching was an inevitable risk of a criminal trial. Since
"[e]very act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a trial is designed
to 'prejudice' the defendant" by trying to convince the fact-finder that the
accused is guilty, "it will be a rare trial of any complexity in which some
proffered evidence by the prosecutor or by the defendant's attorney will
not be found objectionable by the trial court."'1 7 Because of its innocent
character, overreaching properly requires the defendant to make the
82. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608.
83. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
84. See State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 418, 619 P.2d 948, 949 (1980).
85. Id. at 417-18, 619 P.2d at 949.
86. Id. at 418, 619 P.2d at 950.
87. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75.
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choice between a mistrial or continuing with a tainted trial. The line is
firmly drawn, though, at improper intent. If the prosecutor's actions are
designed to cause a mistrial, then double jeopardy will bar a second
trial.8"
The holdings in Dinitz and Kennedy lend full legitimacy to the forced
election of the proposed solution. If factors such as prosecutorial over-
reaching are permitted to create a dilemma for the defendant, certainly the
problem of the unreviewable judge should also count. As the Court noted
in Kennedy, the complexity of evidentiary matters in many trials do create
uncomfortable circumstances for the defendant. But social justice requires
that these occasions should not act as a bar to retrying the defendant.
Unpleasant as this process might be, the accused must bear the weight of
the Government's need to preserve its right to appeal just as he must pay
the price for the overreaching of a zealous prosecutor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of the unreviewable judge has often been ignored because
it has been assumed that mid-trial evidentiary rulings could not be ap-
pealed under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But the solution proposed in this Note
circumvents this dilemma by converting unappealable mid-trial suppres-
sion orders into appealable pre-trial ones. This solution is in no way
designed to trump Congress' decision not to permit interlocutory appeals
during trial. It is meant merely to supplement and protect the grant of
appellate power to the prosecution regarding pre-trial evidentiary rulings.
The power to protect the Government's section 3731 rights is derived
from courts' general authority with regard to mistrials. The lesson to be
learned from mistrial cases such as Perez, Dinitz, and Kennedy is that the
district judge has a duty to terminate a trial when unavoidable mishaps
occur, and reprosecution is proper when the societal interest in retrial out-
weighs the interest of the defendant not to be unduly harassed. Mistrials
based on hung juries, defense counsel misbehavior, and prosecutorial over-
reaching all fall outside the double jeopardy clause. There appear to be
very sound reasons why the preservation of the Government's right to ap-
peal should be added to this list.
88. Id. at 675-76.
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